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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT FOUND NO CLEAR-CUT MEETING OF THE MINDS, 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES UNENFORCEABLE, AWARDED THE PLAINTIFF 
DAMAGES ON A QUASI-CONTRACTUAL BASIS, AND THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS !ti 
THEIR BRIEF FAILED TO SHOW A CLEAR-CUT MEETING OF THE MINDS CONSIDERING 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT, 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
POINT I I 
WHERE THE OFFER IS TO BUY DISTRIBUTORSHIP OF THREE BR.~NDS OF 
BEER AND TWO SOFT DRINKS IN TWO COUNTIES AND A PART OF A THIRD, AND 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS SELLERS PROVIDE "SIGNED AGREEMENTS WITH THE BEER 
COMPANYS TO SHOW THEY HAVE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL IN THIS AREA," AND 
WHERE THE ONLY OTHER ASSETS OF VALUE ARE PRICED SEPARATELY AND WHERE THE 
ONLY TESTIMONY AT TRIAL SHOWS NUMEROUS DEMANDS FOR "EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL 
IN THIS AREA," AND THAT DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS WOULD NOT HAVE MADE PURCHAS[ 
EXCEPT FOR "EXCLUSIVE RIGHT," DID NOT CONS IDER CONTRACT CAME INTO BEING 
UNTIL PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS PROVIDED "EXCLUSIVE RIGHT," ONE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AGREED TO CONTINUE LICENSE UNTIL SIGNED RIGHTS WERE DELIVERED, 
OTHER PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT MADE NO EXPLANATION FOR FAILURE TO DELIVER 
SIGNED AGREEMENTS, AND THIRD PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT SHOW FOR TRIAL, 
IT WOULD BE ERROR TO HOLD THAT "SIGNED AGREEMENTS" AND "EXCLUSIVE RIGHT Of 
DISTRIBUTORSHIP" WERE NOT MATERIAL AND PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS GAVE ADEQUATc 
CONSIDERATION. 
POINT II I 
WHERE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS FAILED TO PERFORM CONDITIONS PRE-
CEDENT OR CONCURRENT, OR, DID NOT GIVE THE CONSIDERATION BARGAINED FOR BY 
THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS ANO THE T:IAL COURT AWARDED PLAINT!~ 
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)616 . 05 EXCESS IVE DAMAGES TO MEET THE ONLY EV ID ENCE OF ACTUAL LOSSES SHOWN 
UNDER POSS IBLE MIC I LLARY TERMS OF A CONTRACT, IF THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR 
Iii HOLDING THE CONTRACT AND THE ACTION OF THE PARTIES AMBIGUOUS, UNCERTAIN, 
C 0~iFLICTING AND AMBIVALENT, SUCH ERROR WOULD BE HARMLESS AND DAMAGES TO THE 
PLWITIFFS-APPELLANTS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO $1424. 88. 
POINT IV 
WHERE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS FAILED TO GIVE THE DEFENDANTS-
RESPONDENTS NOTICE OF NON-PAYMENT OF CHECKS OR DEMAND PAYMENT, DID NOT 
PROVE THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS RELIED ON CHECKS GIVEN, FAILED TO GIVE 
CONSIDERATION FOR CHECKS ISSUED, AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN USELESS FOR THE 
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS TO PERFORM PAYMENT OF THE CHECKS, THE TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT JUDGMENT ON THE CHECKS. 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Court Decisions 
Build, Inc. v. Italasano, S Ct Ut, 1965, 398 P2d 544 •..••••••.• 11 
Continental Bank and Trust Co. vs. Bybee, S Ct Ut, 1957, 306 P2d 773 ..• 11 
Paterson v. Intermountain Capital Corporation, S Ct Ut, 1973, 508 P2d 536 .. 18 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Hartford Accident .18 
and lndemni ty Company, S Ct Ut, 1958, 325 P2d 899 
Stanford Petroleum v. Janssen, St Ct Ut, 1949, 209 P2d 932· .•...•.• 32 
Statutes 
7
-lS-l, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) 32 
7
-lS-2, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) 32 
7-1' 3 
,_ , Utah Code Annotated (1953) 32 
3 
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T 
NATURE OF CASE I 
Plaintiffs-Appellants brought three causes of action on a contra'.: I 
for default and non-payment of checks given as a part of the transaction t: I 
which the Defendants-Respondents ans1-1ered by denial and counterclaimed for ! 
Plaintiffs' failure to perform. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock in the 
Fourth District Court of Uintah County without a jury. The court took the 
matter under advisement and subsequently is sued a memorandum decision. :r, 
the memorandum decision the court found: Exhibit 5, "Earnest Money Receip' 
and Offer to Purchase" dated December 5, 1974, ambiguous, uncertain, con-
fl i ct i ng and unenforceable as an agreement of the pa rt i es. The conduct o'. 
the parties subsequent to December 5, 1974, was al so ambiguous and ambivaler: 
Collateral agreements and understandings which the parties attempted to 
reach subsequent to December 5, 197 4, were loose, ambivalent and uncertain 
(R l 00-101). 
The trial court further found: The parties did create certain 
legal relationships in pursuance of an agreement, including the issuance of 
checks, promissory note, operation by Defendants Earle of the business of 
Great Basin Distributing Company, there was no change of di~ectors, office'i 
or the transfer of capital stock, inventory disposition. A balance of the 
eouities would be achieved by an award to the Plaintiffs-Appellants in the 
sum of $4040.93. That such amount was the value of the inventory on or 
about December 5, 1974. That there was no admitted or proffered evidence 
of fraud or deceipt on the part of the Plaintiffs (R 100-101). 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law in keeping ,,.,ith \he 
4 J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and um decision 1-1ere entered (R 102-103). A judgment also was entered memor 
(R 104 ). Defendants-Respondents moved the court to correct the findings of 
t Co nclusions of law and judgment by reducing the amount of the judgment tac, 
to s2o40. 93 on the 9round that the Defendants-Respondents Earle had al ready 
paid $2000.00 (Rl09-110). This motion was granted and the findings of fact, 
conclusions and law and judgment were corrected with a final award to the 
Plaintiffs-Appellants of $2040.93 (R 129-131, 133). 
From the Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (R 129-131) 
and Judgment (R 133), the Plaintiffs-Appellants appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirm the trial court. Reduce the amount of damages awarded to 
Plaintiffs-Appe 11 ants to $1424. 88. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Earle, a Defendant-Respondent, first learned that Basin Dis-
'.ributing Company was for sale in November or October, 1974, in a discussion 
with Mr. Oberhansly, a Plaintiff-Appellant and a representative of United 
Farm Agency. At the time, Mr. Oberhansly told Mr. Earle that Basin Dis-
tributing Company had certain exclusive ri9hts to distribute certain beers 
ITT 57). 
As the result of negotiations on or about December 5, 1974, certain 
terms and conditions were integrated into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase form from which this law suit arose (Exhibit 5). Exhibit 5, 
JitedOecember 5, 1974, recited that it was to the United Farm Agency, 
5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Roosevelt, Utah. That in consideration of United Farm Agency using ef· !Orto 
to present an offer Betty Earle deposited $500.00, beginning at line 5 01 
Exhibit 5, "to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated o'. 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties and part of Wasatch and being the distributor:· 
for Schlitz, Miller and Hamms Beer, R. C. Cola and Frostie Root Beer. Le: 
it be known that this distributorship is trying to get A & W Root Beerand 
will pass these rights al so." 
Lines 2, 3 and 4 were filled in ~1ith "Betty Earle" and "$500.00 
in cash." Added in ink of the same color and shade on line 8 was "Possess';•, 
! 
will be given 12-6-74." 
After that insertion on line 9 in a darker shade of blue ink, bu: 
more intense in color, was added the follcwing, "All stock in Basin Dist Co. 
included." 
The next insertion was typed at line 13 (Ex. 5). "No buildings 
or personal property being sold." Printed form at 1 ine 14 states, "The 
following personal property shall also be included as part of the property 
purchased;" And then there was typed, "All inventory that is on hand will 
be counted on December 6, 1974, and be paid for cash by buyer. This is 
not included as a part of the purchase price quoted." The number 6 v1as 
inserted after December, and the number 4 inserted after the 7 in 197~ 
was handwritten. 
Lines 17 through 21 (Ex. 5) provided for a total purchase price 
of $6000. 00 with $500. 00 down and $500. 00 per month commencing January lO, 
1975, with interest at the rate of 7% on the unpaid balance, and that the 
monthly payments included interest. 
Then commencing at line 23 (Ex. 5) ~1as typed: "56000. 00 purchase 
price sha 11 be treated as a note and mortgage on unpaid balance and wiii 
6 
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.1. be owed regardless of what buyer does with dealership. Sellers will stl I 
'de signed agreements with the Beer Companys to show they have exclusive 
prOVl 
right to sell in this area." 
Lines 27 through 43 (Ex. 5) were followed with certain insertions 
and deletions hand~1ritten with ink of the same color as others, except as 
noted, that were consistent with the general provisions as indicated above. 
On line 44, United Farm was inserted as being the broker company agent and 
this was by O. B. Oberhansly, one of the plaintiffs, a principal in the 
Basin Distributing Company corporation, and the negotiator for the Plaintiffs-
Appellants. 
On line 51 (Ex. 5) the date 12-5-64 was inserted, the signature 
of o. s. Oberhansly appears, and then there is an X on the right-hand side 
beginning about mid-page, and after the X, the signature, Betty Earle.- On 
line 52 no date is inserted, but there appears the name of Dennis Wilcox, 
Secretary, and under that 1 ine is printed the name Dennis Wilcox. On the 
next signature 1ine below line 52, which signature line was apparently 
inserted, appears the signature Bob May, and printed under the signature 
is the name Bob May. 
It should be noted that the color of the ink and the intensity of 
the color of the signature and printed legend, "Bob May," is the same as 
the insertion on line 9, "All stock in Basin Dist Co. included." 
On the right-half of the page, commencing at approximately line 
52, (Ex. 5) there is typed in "Betty will assume all obligations after 
12
-6-74 and any bills already paid will be refunded to the sellers. Betty 
iiill pay sellers also for $1000.00 deposit on truck. If Betty chooses to 
continue lease on truck." It should be noted that the word, "after," which 
follo>1s obligations was inserted in ink and also the provision, "if Betty 
.cooses to continue lease on truck," which insertions appear in the same 
7 
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color and intensity of ink as the signature of Bob May and the insertion 
on lines 9 and 10, "all stock in Basin Dist Co. included." 
Also inserted between lines 52 and 53 (C:x. 5) is the folloiiing 
recital, "Buyer may rent warehouse starting 12-6-74 for $350. 00 per mo~t~. 
payable in advance until he decides to move. After 8 (then an obliteration 
months Se 11 ers reserve right to change rent. Se 11 ers wi 11 order electric 
put in by 12-5-74 and use rent money to pay for it." On line 55 appears 
the insertion "12-5-74." 
On the 6th of December, 1974, on the basis of the "Earnest Money 
agreement, an inventory was taken that was represented by Exhibit 11 (TT 59, 
This was an inventory of the warehouse only (TT 59). 
On December 6, 1974, the Earles paid $1500.00 in cash on the 
inventory (TT 64). 
On December 6, 1974, Betty Earle made a check in the sum of $350.11) 
payable to Basin Distributing Company upon which it was recited that it 1<as 
for rent warehouse. This was check number 182 (Exhibit 9). 
Also on December 6, 1974, Betty Earle prepared a check payable to 
O. B. Oberhansly in the sum of $1540.93. This was check number 184 as 
appears in the upper right-hand corner of the check. The recital at the 
bottom in the lower 1 eft-hand corner of the check, "for Basin Distributing 
stock." (Ex. 2). The check in the sum of $1540.93 (Ex. 2) was to be held 
by Mr. Oberhansly (TT 64). 
Between December 6 and December 16 there were deliveries and 
also charges made against Basin Distributing Comapny which totalled 513 16 ·01 
(TT 63). 
A second inventory was made of the contents of the \'/a rehouse on 
December 16, 1974 (TT 61). The inventory at the warehouse had changed sub· 
8 
rd 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stantially between December 6 and December 16, 1974 (TT 62). 
on December 16 or 17, 1974, Mr. Earle gave to Mr. Oberhansly a 
check on Rainbow Properties in the sum of $1500.00, which check was a Rain-
bow Properties check, and $40. 93 in cash. The check was check number 450 
(Ex. 4, TT 64). About mid-way on the right-hand side of Exhibit 4 it 
recited, "Basin Dist. Inventory PMT." Mr. Earle asked for the return of 
f'rs. Earle's check at the time he delivered Exhibit 4 (TT 67). Mrs. Earle's 
check was never returned. The request for the return of Mrs. Earle's check 
was made several times (TT 67). 
Mr. Earle asked for signed agreements showing exclusive rights of 
distributorship on many occasions. He made the first request on December 6, 
1974. Mr. Earle asked Mr. Oberhans ly every time he saw Mr. Oberhans 1 y and 
sometimes by phone for written evidence of the rights of di stri butorshi p 
(TI 82-83). Mr. Earle also asked Mr. May for written evidence of the rights 
of distributorship on December 6 or 7, 1974, at Mr. May's office in Vernal. 
,':r. May said that ne did not have them but would get them. That Mr. May 
would secure those in writing for Mr. Earle (TT 83). Mr. Earle had not 
met Mr. Wilcox and consequently did not ask Mr. Wilcox for written evidence 
of exclusive rights of distributorship. 
The distributorship rights were of primary importance to Mr. 
Earle (TT 82). 
Mr. Earle had no prior experience with beer distributorships 
ITT 81). 
Mr. and Mrs. Earle became discouraged as the result of not 
receiving the exclusive rights of distributorship and when Schlitz dis-
tribution folded, that finalized the business and the interest (TT 84). 
The Earles had relied on the exclusive signed agreements for 
L 9 
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distributorship of beers (TT 90). 
The distributorship rights were the only reason that Mr Ea, 
. r' e 
bought the business (TT 81). 
Mr. Earle testified: Without the exclusive rights of distributer. 
ship I'd never have bought the distributorship (TT 82). 
The Earles never received any written evidence of signed agreemer,:: 
of exclusive rights of distributorship in the area (TT 70). 
Mr. Earle again asked Mr. Oberhansly for evidence of the rights 
of exclusive distributorship after Sehl itz deliveries were stopped (TT SH,.: 
Mr. Earle last made the demand on Mr. Oberhansly for signed agree· I 
men ts with the beer companies to show they had exclusive right to se 11 in 
the area as recited in Ex hi bit 5 when Schlitz cance 11 ed the beer. The pur· 
pose in asking was to see if there were any legal recourse to regain the 
distributorship of Sehl itz (TT 88). This was about February 3, 1975 (TT Bl" 
Mr. Oberhansly never offered any explanation as to why he did not 
produce the ~iritten evidence of the rights of distributorship. Mr. Earle 
assumed it was procrastination (TT 84). 
Mr. Earle employed a manager-driver in reliance upon the exclusiv: 
rights of distributorship (TT 90). The first delivery was made by the new 
driver employed by Mr. Earle on December 17, 1974 (TT 67). The Earles 
operated Basin Distributing Company from December 17, 1974,·until February 
3 or 10, 1975. After February 3, 1975, the distributing company which de-
livered or handled Schlitz Beer, Hamms Beer and Millers Beer refused to 
make deliveries to Basin Distributing Company (TT 74). 
The Earles did attempt to continue operation after February 3• 
1975 (TT 75). The attempt was for less than two weeks (TT 76). The 
ina their Earles stopped operating Basin Distributing Company after canvass · 
10 
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ts and finding they could no longer operate profitably because Schlitz accoun 
Beer accounted for the major portion of the sales and Basin Distributing 
Company could no longer get Sehl itz Beer (TT 77). 
Mr. Earle also testified (TT 104) at line 18, that no license 
'iias applied for "because Mr. Oberhansly said until they delivered the ex-
clusive rights in writing that they would continue it in their own name, 
and r never considered I bought that business, and I've never had the stock 
transferred into my wife's or my name." The court: Never considered you 
bought it? The witness: No. I mean never completed, never got the 
exclusive, never got the stock in our name. Nothing. 
POINT I 
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT FOUND NO CLEAR-CUT MEETING OF THE MINDS, 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES UNENFORCEABLE, AWARDED THE PLAINTIFF 
DAMAGES ON A QUASI-CONTRACTUAL BAS IS, AND THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN 
THEIR BRIEF FAILED TO SHOW A CLEAR-CUT MEETING OF THE MINDS CONSIDERING 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT, 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
In Build, Inc. v. Italasano, S Ct Lit, 1975, 398 P2d 544, this 
court sustained the trial court where the trial court found no clear meeting 
of the minds and no enforceable contract -=or building a house. And the 
trial court, to effect substantial justice in equity, on a quasi-contractual 
basis, awarded plaintiff a judgment for a sum less than the contract price. 
The Supreme Court considered the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff in sustaining the trial court. 
In Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Bybee, S Ct Ut, 1957, 306 
D/d 773 h 
' '
1 ere the defendant asserted a defense against a note that had 
11 
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been to the negotiated plaintiff, the court stated at page 776 in sub t· 
' s one:. 
that the intent of the parties to contract should be ascertained (l) f rom 
the four corners of the instrument itself, ( 2) from other contemporaneous 
writings concerning the same subject matter, and (3) from extrinsic and 
parole evidence of the intentions of the parties. 
In this case it appears from the evidence that the Defendants-
Respondents treated the transaction as the purchase of exclusive rights of 
di stri butorshi p of certain beers and soft drinks, inventory, an option to 
rent a building, and an option to lease a truck. The Plaintiffs-Appellants 
appear to have treated it as the sale of the inventory, rent of a warehouse, 
1 ease of a truck, and the purchase of a corporate shell without any particu· 
lar assets or value; each item bearing a separate price. 
Lines 5 though 8 of Ex. 5 provide, "To secure and apply on the 
purchase of the property situated at: Duchesne and Uintah Counties and 
part of Wasatch and being the distributorship for Sehl itz, Miller and Hamms 
Beer and R. C. Cola and Frostie Root Beer. Let it be known that this 
distributorship is trying to get A & W Root Beer and will pass these rights 
a 1 so." 
What was the distributorship? Lines 5 through 8 of Exhibit5 
can be construed as meaning the distributorship rights for the products 
named: Schlitz, Miller and Hamms Beer and R. C. Cola and Frostie Root 
Beer, and possibly A & W Root Beer. On line 17 of Exhibit 5, "Let it be 
known that this distributorship is trying to get A & W Root Beer and will 
pass these rights also," may be construed as giving some mea~ing to the 
term, distributorship, but when considered in the light of future wording, 
the question is, what meaning? 
l] 
Next is recited on lines 8 and 9 of Exhibit 5, "possession wi. 
12 J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be given 12-6-74." The testimony was actual possession not taken until 
ber 16 or 17, 1974 (TT 64). Between December 6, 1974, and December 17, oecem 
1974 , there was considerable change in inventory all of which took place 
as the result of continued operation by Plaintiffs-Appellants (TT 62). The 
recital and the acts of the parties are not consistent. This supports a 
conclusion of ambiguity. 
Lines 9 and 10 of Exhibit 5 recite, "All stock in Basin Dist Co. 
included." Does this recital mean the stock in trade is included with 
ohrase "possession ~1ill be given"? Does the phrase refer to the capital 
stock of Basin Distributing Company and it is included as a part of the 
transaction? Considering the testimony, lack of testimony at the time of 
trial, and the fact that no capital stock was ever transferred, there was 
confusion and ambiguity with respect to this recital, both in the agreement 
and the acts and conduct of the parties. 
A check issued December 6, 1974, by Betty Earle in the sum of 
$1540.93 recites in the lower left-hand corner, "for Basin Distributing 
Stock" (Ex. 2). This recital in the document supports the theory that lines 
9 and 10 of Exhibit 5 were intended to refer to the stock in trade. This 
theory is further supported when the check (Ex. 2) is taken in conjunction 
'iith the amount of the inventory determined on December 6 as set out in the 
testimony at trial and as found by the trial judge, $4040.93 (TT 59, Ex. 11, 
R 102). 
Exhibit 4 contributes to the ambiguity in that said exhibit is a 
check of Rainbow Properties Corporation in the sum of $1500.00 made payable 
to O. B. Oberhansly. This check, at about mid-point on the right-hand side, 
recites "B · 0 · asin ist. inventory PMT." The testimony at trial was that this 
'.ceck, together with the sum of $40.93, was given to replace the check 
13 
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issued by Mrs. Earle, Ex. 2 (TT 64, 67). These recital and checks add to 
the ambiguity. 
Lines 14, 15 and le recite, "All inventory that is on hand will 
be counted on December 6, 1974, and be paid for cash by buyer. This is 
not included as a part of the purchase price quoted." The evidence at the 
time of trial established that the inventory was counted. That the amount 
in the warehouse arrived at was $3040.93. The testimony further establishea 
at the time of trial that this was actually paid for by cash in the sum of 
$1500.00 paid by Mr. Earle and a check in the sum of $1540.93 given by Mrs. 
Earle (Ex. 2). Mrs. Earle's check was to be held and replaced by a check 
given by Mr. Earle. A post-dated check from Rainbow Properties Corporation 
in the sum of $1500. 00 (Ex. 4) and $40. 93 in cash were given to replace 
Mrs. Earle's check (TT 64, 67). This provision of Ex. 5 and the acts and 
conduct of the parties contribute to ambiguity. 
Lines 23 through 26 of Exhibit 5 recite, "$6000.00 purchase price 
will be treated as a note and mortgage on unpaid balance and will still be 
owed regardless of what buyer does with dealership. Sellers will provide 
signed agreements with the Beer Companys to show they have exclusive right 
to sell in this area." Here the word is dealership. Is there a difference 
between dealership on 1 ine 24 and distributorship on 1 ine 6 and distribu-
torship on line 7 (Ex. 5)? 
On lines 24, 25 and 26, Ex. 5, it is recited, "Seller will provide 
signed agreements with the Beer Companys to show they have exclusive right 
to sell in this area." At the time of trial Mr. McRae argued that there wil 
no provision in the agreement that Exhibit 5 provided for viritten agreements. 
This writer argued that if they were signed, the inference was that they 
must be in writing. It is pointed out that all of the clarity that the 
14 J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiffs-Appellants contend for is not there. 
Between lines 52 and 53 of Exhibit 5 on the right-hand side there 
is typed, with some changes in ink, "Betty will assume all obligations as of 
12 _6_74 and bills already paid will be refunded to sellers. Betty will pay 
sellers also for $1000.00 deposit on truck. If Betty chooses to continue 
lease on truck." 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants continued the business from 12-6-74 to 
12-17-74, made charges against the company, made sales and kept receipts. 
w~t would be the effect? Were the Earles to cover their charges and 
shortages? Mr. Earle tried to work out an adjustment. Pl a i ntiffs-Appe 11 ants 
did not cooperate. Again, the parties' acts and conduct add to ambiguity. 
Who made the lease payments on the truck? Were all of the.lease 
payments paid? These questions were unanswered by evidence at the time of 
trial. This leads to the conclusion of ambiguity. 
Al so between lines 52 and 53 there is recited, "Buyer may rent 
warehouse starting 12-6-74 for $350.00 per month payable in advance until 
he decides to move. After eight months seller reserves right to change 
rent. Sellers will order electric put in by 12-6-74 and use rent money to 
pay for it." First of all, the term "may" is permissive. Actual possession 
and operation did not start until 12-17-74. The only precise date of 
termination of operation was February 3, 1975. Was the "electric" put in? 
Are the answers to these questions cl ear and unambiguous? Did the evidence 
or testimony at the time of trial help to clarify? It is the Defendants-
Respondents' position that, again, the provision of Exhibit 5 and the acts 
and conduct of the parties do not lead to a conclusion of clarity, but lead 
to a conclusion of ambiguity. 
Exhibit 2, a check for $1540.93, was to be reld. It is pointed 
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out that Exhibit 9, a check for rent, and Exhibit 2, both involved in the 
transaction, are made out to different payees. Exhibit 9, rent for the 
warehouse, was made payable to Basin Distributing. Exhibit 2, same date, 
same maker, was made payable to O. B. Oberhansly. The difference in payee; 
supports the testimony that the check in the sum of $1540.93, Exhibit 2, 
was to be held by Mr. Oberhansly. However, again, this does not contribute i 
to clarity, but to ambiguity. 
Exhibits 3 and 4 were both made payable to 0. B. Oberhansly. Thii 
would tend to support the testimony that the checks were post-dated. However. 
this does not support the theory of clarity, but supports the conclusion of 
ambiguity of the documents and the acts of the parties. 
In view of the fol lowing ambiguities in: (l) Does the use of 
"distributorship," "dealership," "exclusive rights," and "Seller will prov':: 
signed agreements," clarify the transaction? (2) What is the "stock" in 
Basin Dist. Co? Stock in trade? Capital stock? (3) Is "All stock in 
Basin Dist Co. included" stock in trade included in delivery of possession, 
or capital stock included in delivery of possession? (4) Do the payees of 
each of the checks clarify the transaction? (5) Does continued operation 
by Plaintiffs-Appellants with charges and reduction of inventory clarify' 
(6) What result should be reached on the rent of the warehouse? Did the 
Plaintiffs-Appellants clarify? (7) What actually happened to the deposit 
on the truck? (8) Were 1 ease payments made and the lease in good standing 
when Plaintiffs-Appellants were using the truck? (9) Does the check to be 
held and the post-dated checks add to clarity or ambiguity? These questions 
and the lack of answers a 11 support the holding of the tri a 1 court that the 
. d . 11 a ry agreements acts and conduct of the parties and the documents an anc1 
all contributed to ambiguity. 
of ambiguity. 
th conclusior It seems apparent they support e 
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All of the foregoing considered in the light most favorable to the 
Defendants-Respondents support the conclusion of the trial court. The trial 
court should be sustained. 
POINT II 
WHERE THE OFFER IS TO BUY DISTRIBUTORSHIP OF THREE BRANDS OF BEER 
~D TWO SOFT DRINKS IN TWO COUNTIES AND A PART OF A THIRD, AND PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS SELLERS PROVIDE "SIGNED AGREEMENTS WITH THE BEER COMPANYS TO SHOW 
THEY HAVE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL IN THIS AREA," AND WHERE THE ONLY OTHER 
ASSETS OF VALUE ARE PRICED SEPARATELY AND WHERE THE ONLY TESTIMONY AT TRIAL 
SHOWS NUMEROUS DEMANDS FOR "EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL IN THIS AREA," AND THAT 
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS ~IOULD NOT HAVE MADE PURCHASE EXCEPT FOR "EXCLUSIVE 
RIGHT," DID NOT CONSIDER CONTRACT CAME INTO BEING UNTIL PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS 
PROVIDED "EXCLUSIVE RIGHT," ONE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AGREED TO CONTINUE LI-
CENSE UNTIL SIGNED RIGHTS WERE DELIVERED, OTHER PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT MADE NO 
EXPLANATION FOR FAILURE TO DELIVER SIGNED AGREEMENTS, AND THIRD PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT DID NOT SHOW FOR TRIAL, IT WOULD BE ERROR TO HOLD THAT "SIGNED 
AGREEMENTS" AND "EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF DISTRIBUTORSHIP" WERE NOT MATERIAL AND 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS GAVE ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION. 
The legal effect of failure of consideration can be: (l) none; 
(2) the award of damages; ( 3) legal excuse from counter-per!ormance to the 
failure of consideration; (4) the injured party may not only recover 
damages for failure of consideration but be legally excused from his own 
counter-performance. The legal effect given to failure of consideration 
depends on whether or not the failure of consideration was material. 
'ilhether or not a failure of consideration is material is a question of 
fact for which there is no general rule; it is a question of fact in each 
:'se to be determined from the circumstances of each case. 
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In Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Company, S Ct Ut, 1958, 325 P2d 899, where there "
1
,, 
a failure to provide power for a short period of time to a construction 
site and such power lack did not prevent construction or substantially de\ 
the project, it was held that it was severable and did not vitally change 
the transaction nor did it release the other party completely from perfor-
mance, but gave such party a cause of action for damages. 
However, in Paterson v. Intermountain Capital Corporation, s Ct 
Ut, 1973, 508 P2d 536, where the plaintifff was to mortgage certain landai 
security for a loan, the defendant was excused from performance where the 
plaintiff sold the land and was incapable of mortgaging the land. In that 
case the Plaintiff sold the land three months before a breach of contract 
by the defendant would have occurred and the defendant did not know of the 
breach until the action was filed. 
It becomes essential to determine whether or not the failure of 
the Plaintiffs-Appellants to deliver signed agreements of exclusive right; 
to sell in the area was such a failure of consideration in view of the inter: 
of the parties that it excused the Defendants-Respondents from performance. 
That the delivery of "signed agreements" was of essence and material to the 
contract is supported by the evidence. 
In Exhibit 5, after a recital that consideration is deposited in 
the sum of $500.00 in cash, the document, at line 5, the printed form~~ 
tinues: "To secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at, 
after which is typed: "Duchesne and Uintah Counties and part of Wasatch 
and being the distributorship for Sehl itz, Miller and Hamms Beer and R.J.. 
Cola and Frostie Root Beer. Let it be known that the distributorshi0 
1 " Then there trying to get A & W Root Beer and will pass these rights a so. 
"dthen1ninkofl is added in ink, "Possession will be given 12-6-74, an 
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I diffeceot ;hod• eod i """' i ty, "A 11 ;took 
Under 1 in i ng added. 
in Basin Dist Co. included." 
Typed on Exhibit 5 at lines 14, 15 and 16 is the provision, "All 
inventory that is on hand will be counted on December 6, 1974, and be paid 
for cash by buyer. This is not included as a part of the purchase price 
quoted." 
Typed on Exhibit 5 at line 23 is the provision: "$6000.00 purchase 
orice will be treated as a note and mortgage on unpaid balance and will still 
be owed regardless of what buyer does with the dealership. Sellers will pro-
vide signed agreements with the Beer Companys to show they have exclusive 
right to sell in this area." Underlining added. 
Between lines 52 and 53 there is typed and written, "Betty will 
assume all obligations after 12-6-74 and any bills already paid will be re-
funded to the sellers. Betty will pay seller also $1000.00 deposit on truck 
if Betty chooses to continue lease on truck." Portions underlined were 
hand written in ink. 
The testimony: At the time of trial Mr. Wilcox stated that the 
bank account that Basin had with Zions would be continued by Plaintiffs 
and that such continuance would be to deposit the moneys that came in from 
the sale of the business and the accounts receivable that were to come in 
(TT 41). 
Mr. Earle at the time of trial testified that he had no prior 
experience with beer distributorships (TT 81). 
The distributorship rights were the only reason Mr. Earle bought 
the business (TT 81). 
The distributorship rights were of primary importance to Mr. 
:arle (TT 82). 
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never 
Without the exclusive rights of distributorship Mr. Earle would f 
have bought the distributorship (TT 82). 
Mr. Earle asked for signed agreements showing exclusive rights oi 
distributorship on many occasions. He made the first request on December I.', 
1974 (TT 82). 
Mr. Earle asked Mr. Oberhansly every time he saw Mr. Oberhansly 
and sometimes by phone for written evidence of the rights of distributorshir 
(TT 82-83). 
Mr. Earle also asked Mr. May for the written evidence of the 
rights of distributorship on December 6 or 7, 1974, at Mr. May's office in 
Vernal. Mr. May said that he did not have them but that he would get them. 
That Mr. May would secure those in writing for Mr. Earle (TT 83). 
Mr. Earle asked Mr. Oberhansly for evidence of the rights of ex-
clusive distributorship after Sehl itz deliveries were stopped (TT 84-85). 
Mr. Earle last made the demand upon Mr. Oberhansly for signed 
agreements with the beer companies to show they had exc 1 us i ve rights to 
sell in the area when Sehl itz cancelled the beer. The purpose in asking 
was to see if there were any 1 ega l recourse to regain the distributorship 
of Schlitz (TT 88). 
Mr. Earle testified at the time of trial (TT 103) with respect 
to the application for 1 icense and by way of why no application was made 
for the license, at line 17, that no license was applied for "because Mr. 
Oberhansly said until they delivered the exclusive rights in writing that 
they would continue under their license. I give him $60.00 to pay the bond 
himself and to continue it in their own name, and I never considered 1 
'fe'I 
bought that business, and I've never had the stock transferred into my wi 
or my name." The court: Never considered you bought it? The witness: ::o. 
· t the <tock ·r, I mean I never completed, never got the exclusive, never go -· 
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our name. Nothing. 
And at (TT 103-104) when asked why no licenses had been applied 
M Earle testified at TT 104, l ~ne 18, "because Mr. Oberhansly said for, r · 
that he'd consent, ~1e'd hire the driver, continue driving the stuff until 
such time as the exclusive franchise was delivered, then we could decide 
whose name to put the license in. And it was just called the license. 
don't know any of the details required. Due to the fact of a juvenile 
situation I knew that I would not be able to participate in, and, therefore, 
did not take any stock in my name. I did not -- I was not interested. We 
11ere looking for a family business with cash flow, and my wife was either 
going to have it or someone else. And it was never --. " 
To say that the "Sellers will provide signed agreements with the 
Beer Companys to show they have exclusive right to sell in this area" is 
not of essence is to ignore the written documents and to ignore a 11 of the 
testimony at the time of trial. 
When Exhibit 5 is examined, and more particularly lines 5 through 
10, it can be seen that the parties were dealing with distributorship rights. 
The area of Duchesne and Uintah Counties and part of Wasatch is described. 
The distributorship is for Schlitz, Miller and Harnms Beer and R. C. Cola 
and Frostie Root Beer. It is also stated that the distributorship is trying 
to get A & W Root Beer and will pass these rights also. These provisions 
1·1ere typed. 
By virtue of position and the manner in which it is written, i.e., 
by hand, the date of possession was an afterthought. 
Again, the position and the manner of writing, i.e., "All stock 
in Basin Dist Co. included," was also an afterthought. This statement 
follows the handwritten statement with respect to possession and the type-
11ritten st 
atement with respect to distributorship rights. It is also in a 
21 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
different shade and intensity of ink. This indicates that the consideratl·.· 
of stock was also an afterthought. 
Since the reference is to stock only, it could have referred to \ 
the stock in trade or the capital stock. This was not spelled out in the I 
I 
writing. These facts give weight to the conclusion that the thing for 
which the Defendants-Respondents were bargaining was the distributorship 
rights and not the capital stock of Basin Distributing Company. I 
! 
That the reference could have been to "stock in trade" is supper!:: 11 
by Exhibit 2, check #184 signed by Betty Earle, on which is recited in the 1, 
lower left-hand corner, "For Basin Distributing Stock." This check was con·' 
sidered by all and recognized by all at the time of trial to be a check 
qiven for stock in trade to be held until replaced. 
Next, part of line 24 and lines 25 and 26 of Exhibit 5 should be 
considered. There it is recited, "Sellers will provide signed agreements 
with the Beer Companys to show they have exclusive right to sell in this 
area." When considered in the light of all the facts and circumstances in 
the case, it appears that the importance was attached to the exclusive righti 
of sale and not to the dealership or to the stock in Basin Distributing 
Company. The parties were dealing with the rights of sale as being of value;· 
dealership as being of little or no value. 
A separate provision was made for pricing the inv(lntory; continu· 
ation of the lease of the truck; and rent of the warehouse. The payment of 
the sum of $6000. 00 was for something to be delivered by the Plaintiffs· 
Appellant Sellers. The stock in Basin Distributing Company and disposition 
of the dealership were afterthoughts, assumptions of Plaintiffs-Appellants' 
counsel, and casual matters. The only thing of value to be exchanged for 
. Th · nificance the $6000.00 was the exclusive rights of distributorship. e sig 
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I the Beer Companys to show they have exclusive right to sell in this area" 
--
is a failure of consideration. 
The failure to deliver the exclusive rights of sale went to the 
essence of the contract and the Defendants-Respondents were entitled to 
recover damaqes for the failure and were excused from giving their own 
counter-performa nee. 
The testimony of Mr. Earle at the time of trial was direct and 
unequivocal that the exclusive rights of sale were the primary thing for 
which the Defendants-Respondents bargained (TT 81-82). Further, his testi-
mony was to the effect that unt i 1 he received such rights the transaction 
v1as not consummated (TT 103). 
Mr. Oberhansly sat in the courtroom throughout the testimony of 
the Defendants-Respondents. Mr. Oberhansly was a plaintiff in the action, 
a party of interest in the corporation, and the primary negotiator of the 
contract. At no time did he take the stand to offer any explanation or 
denial of any of the testimony of Mr. Earle. He stood mute. 
Mr. Dberhansly is not a party to this appeal. 
Mr. Wil:ox, a principal and officer in Basin Distributing Company, 
a party plaintiff to the action, and one of the witnesses at the time of 
the trial did not deny, explain or otherwise overcome the only conclusion 
that can be reached from both the documentary evidence and the testimony 
of the Defendants-Respondents that the rights of sale in the area were of 
essence to the contract and the primary consideration to be given by the 
Plaintiffs-Appellants to the Defendants-Respondents in return for the pay-
ment of the sum of S6000. 00. 
Mr. May, a principal in Basin Distributing Company, an officer in 
the ':ornpany, and one of the plaintiffs in this action, did not attend the 
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in the transaction. 
No one offered evidence or contended at the time of trial tha: :·,' 
capital stock in Basin Distributing Company had any monetary value whatsJe,:,. 
That the ca pi ta l stock was bargained for was an assumption of counsel for 
Plaintiffs-Appellants. The accounts receivable were to be retained by 
Basin Distributing Company. The inventory was to be paid for separately. 
The warehouse rent was to be paid for separately. The truck, if the lease 
v1ere to be continued by the Defendants, was to be paid for by the payment 
of $1000.00 on deposit, apparently with the lessors to the Plaintiffs. Trie 
only thing of value that can be considered as being required as considerat':· 
for the payment of the sum of $6000.00 is the exclusive rights of sale oi 
beer in the area defined in Exhibit 5. 
The failure of the Plaintiffs-Appellants to deliver signed agree· 
ments with the beer companies showing exclusive rights of sale in the are: 
of Duchesne, Uintah and part of Wasatch Counties was a failure of considera· 
tion that would excuse the performance by the Defendarrts-Respondents of the 
oayment of $6000.00. Such a failure of consideration would also be the 
grounds for the award of damages to the Defendants-Respondents. The denial 
of the receipt of evidence showing the damages of the Defendants-Respondent; 
was on the basis of hearsay evidence. Such was not the fact with respect t: 
the failure of consideration and excuse from performance by the Defendants· 
Respondents. It would be error to hold that there 1-1as sufficient consideri· 
ti on and performance to uphold the enforcement of the agreement for the 
Defendants-Respondents to pay the sum of $6000.00. 
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POINT I I I 
WHERE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS FAILED TO PERFORM CONDITIONS PRE-
CEDENT OR CONCURRENT, OR, DID NOT GIVE THE CONSIDERATION BARGAINED FOR BY 
:HE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS AND THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED PLAHITI FFS-APPELLANTS 
5616. 05 EXCESS I VE DAMAGES TO MEET THE ONLY EV ID ENCE OF ACTUAL LOSSES SHOWN 
UfiDER POSSIBLE ANCILLARY TERMS OF A CONTRACT, IF THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN 
HOLDING THE CONTRACT AND THE ACTION OF THE PARTIES AMBIGUOUS, UNCERTAIN, 
CONFLICING AND AMBIVALENT, SUCH ERROR WOULD BE HARMLESS AND DAMAGES TO THE 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO $1424. 88. 
The document and the acts of the parties that is the subject of 
litigation was an offer made by the Earl es, Defendants-Respondents, under 
date of December 5, 1974 (Ex. 5). This offer was accepted by Messrs. 
Oberhansly, Wilcox and May, Plaintiffs-Appellants. Under that offer De-
fendants-Respondents tendered the performance of certain acts: de 1 i very of 
the down payment of $500.00, which also constituted a monthly payment. 
Upon acceptance, the Plaintiffs-Appell ants were then to perform acts: the 
Plaintiffs-Appellants were to deliver on December 5, 1974, the "distributor-
ship for Schlitz, Miller and Hamms Beer and R. C. Cola and Frostie Root Beer." 
There was to be a delivery of rights acauired in the future, A & W Root Beer. 
All stock in Basin Distributing Company was to be delivered (lines 9 and 10, 
Ex. 5). The kind of stock, in trade or capital, was not defined. The 
parties were to count all inventory on hand on December 6, 1974. Defendants-
Respondents were to pay cash for the inventory (lines 14, 15 and 16, Ex. 5). 
The Defendants-Respondents were to: give a note for the purchase price 
(lines 20-24, Ex. 5). The Plaintiffs-Appellants were to: "Provide signed 
igreements wtth the Beer Companys to show they have exclusive right to sell 
in this area" (lines 24, 25 and 26, Ex. 5) Deli very of these documents was 
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the truck (TT 59). Defendants-Respondents (l) delivered $1500.00 cash'· 1 
I 
payment on the inventory (TT 64); (2) gave a check in the sum of $1540.9]. ; 
which check was to be held until another check was given to replace it!'-
64); (3) gave $500.00 in cash toward the $6000.00 purchase price (TT 59); 
and (4) gave a note in the sum of $5500.00 to Plaintiffs-Appellants to be 
paid at the rate of $500.00 per month (Ex. l). 
Plaintiffs-Appellants continued operation of the business until 
December 17, 1974, sold from the inventory and incurred additional clai~s. 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants did not perform the condition, "Seller> 
will provide signed agreements with the Beer Companys to show they have 
exclusive right to sell in this area." (Lines 24, 25 and 26, Ex. 5). 
The distributorship rights were the only reason that Mr. Earle 
bought the business (TT 81). The distributorship rights were of primary 
importance to Mr. Earle (TT 82). Without the exclusive rights of distribu· 
torship Mr. Earle would never have bought the distributorship (TT 82). Mr. 
Earle asked for signed agreements showing exclusive rights of distributorsn': 
on many occasions. He made the first request on December 6, 1974 (TT 82). 
Mr. Earle asked Mr. Oberhansly every time he saw Mr. Oberhansly and somet 111' 
by phone for the written evidence of the rights of distributorship (TT 82·83 · 
Mr. Earle also asked My May for 11iritten evidence on the rights 
of distributorship on December 6 or 7, 1974, at Mr. May's office in Vernal. 
Mr. May said that he did not have them but 1-1oul d get them. That Mr. May 
would secure those in writing for Mr. Earle (TT 83). 
Mr. Earle had not met Mr. Wilcox and conseauently did not ask "'r 
Wilcox for written evidence of exclusive rights of distributorship (Ti;.::. 
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orocrastination (TT 84). As the result of this failure to deliver the 
signed agreements sho~1ing exclusive rights of distributorship with certain 
beer companies, Mr. Earle testified that he considered the contract never 
came into existence and that the Defendants never really took over (TT 103-
105). 
No evidence was given at the time of trial to explain failure. 
Mr. Oberhansly, present at the trial, did not deny any part of the Defendants' 
testimony. 
This failure to deliver signed agreements with the beer companies 
of exclusive rights of distributorship can be viewed as follows: (l) 
Failure to perform a condition precedent; (2) Failure to perform a condition 
concurrent; or, (3) That there was a failure of consideration. 
If the failure to deliver "signed agreements with the Beer Com-
panys to show they have exclusive right to sell in this area" is the failure 
to perform a condition precedent, no contract came into existence. 
If the failure to deliver "signed agreements with the Beer Com-
panys to show they have exclusive right to sell in this area" is the failure 
to perform a condition concurrent with the de 1 i very of the note and the 
$500.00 as down payment on the distributorship, then the Defendants-Respondents 
viere excused from further performance because of failure to perform a condition 
concurrent. 
If the view is adopted that the failure to deliver the "signed 
agreements with the Beer Companys to show they have exclusive right to sell 
in this area" is the failure of consideration, then the Defendants-Respondents 
are excused from performance by failure of consideration. That the "signed 
agreernents" were ma':erial is pointed out above by Mr. Earle's testimony which 
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was not rebutted in any way. 
That the Plaintiffs Wilcox and May recognized this term of the 
contract, i.e. , "signed agreements 1-1i th the Beer Companys to show they 
have exclusive right to sell in this area" is evidenced by their Reply:: ' 
the Defendants' Counterclaim (R 11), more particularly, paragraph 2 of sr: 
Reply, which states "Admit paragraph 2 and Plaintiffs further allege that 
said signed agreements were in fact delivered to the Defendants in the 
form of United States Government License, which in the industry acts as:~: 
exclusive right to sell document or documents, as the case may be, Ylith :n: 
subject beer companies." This al legation was neither supported by evidenc' 
or argument by the Plaintiffs Wilcox and May at the time of trial. 
The Plaintiff Oberhansly, in his Reply, "Ans1-1er of 0. B. Obernani 
to Counterclaim" (R 17) recognized the provision in the contract but then 
attempted to explain it away. Mr. Oberhansly did not even take the stand 
during the trial even though he was present at all times. Nor did Mr. 
Oberhansly deny the demands made on him by Mr. Earle. 
If the view is taken that there is severability and that the fore· 
going disposes of the purchase of the distributorship, then conside~ciM 
might be given to the cost of the inventory, rent of the warehouse and t~.e 
truck. However, it should be noted that neither the warehouse nor the trucK , 
were of any use to the Defendants-Respondents unless they had the distribu· 
torship. Or, at least they were not forced out of business by the lack oi 
a product to sell that was saleable in the market. 
the tr 1.al J"udge di'd award the sum of In considering the inventory 
$4040. 93 with interest at the rate of 85~ per annum from February 11, 1975 ' 
1971 that amount being the value of the inventory on or about December 5, 
. h 
(R 101). Against this was subsequently allowed the sum of $2000.00, 1'hic 
sum was represented by an allowance of $1500.00 cash paid Jn the in·ientor 
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and the $500.00 cash paid on the distributorship. 
The allowance of 52000.00 did not make allowance for the shortages 
of the inventory and purchases and sa 1 es th3t occurred between December 6, 
1974 , and December 16 or 17, 1974. The shortages totalled $1316. 05 (TT 63). 
The benefits of these deliveries and the shortages of inventory did not 
inure to the benefit of the Defendants-Respondents. These shortages were 
not mentioned by the trial court at the time. 
If the view is taken that the warehouse was severable from the 
r"est of the contract, then the rent for the month of January, i.e., from 
January 6 to February 6, would have been more than offset by the shortage 
of inventory. This allowance would have been consistent with the testimony 
of Mr. Earle that the Earles operated Basin Distributing Company from 
December 17, 1974, until February 3, 1975, at which time Gateway Distributing 
Company, which delivered or handled Schlitz Beer, Hamms Beer and Millers 
Beer, refused to make deliveries to Basin Distributing Company (TT 74). The 
only subsequent activities of the Earles was the Earles' attempt to continue 
operation after February 3, 1975, after canvassing their accounts and finding 
that they could no longer operate profitably because Schlit'- Beer accounted 
for the major portion of their sales and Basin Distributing Company could no 
longer sell Schlitz Beer (TT 76-77). 
In considering the severability of the arrangements with respect 
to the truck, there was an addition to Exhibit 5 which provided "Betty will 
pay sellers also for $1000.00 on truck. If Betty chooses to continue lease 
on truck." This provision was at the option of the Earles. There was no 
testimony or evidence submitted at the time of trial as to (1) the amount 
of t' ne rental for the truck, (2) the cause of the loss of the truck or 
repossession, or (3) whether or not the $1000.00 deposit was forfeited for 
anv 'oa,0n tt .b 
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p 
I 
as the evidence submitted at the time of trial was concerned, the Plaint'·' 
I 
I Appellants may have been able to recover their $1000.00 deposit from the,, 1 
of the true k except for Plaintiff s-Appe 11 ants' own acts or omi ss i ans. ·,, 
only evidence at trial was Mr. Wilcox when he testified that he, Mr. flilc: 
did not receive the $1000.00 described in Ex. 5 (TT 45). 
Again, with respect to the severability of the provision of 
Exhibit 5 with respect to the truck, the shortage of the inventory af~r 
December 6, i.e., on December 16 or 17, may have more than offset any los> 
of rental paid or to be paid on the truck. 
Exhibit 5 failed as a contract between the parties because of th: 
fa i 1 ure to perform a con di ti on precedent or concurrent by de 1 i very of 1's:g·:: 
agreements with the Beer Companys to show they have exc 1 us i ve right to sell 
in this area" or as a failure to perform the same condition as a conditior. 
concurrent. Furthermore, performance by the Pl a inti ffs-Appe 11 ants failed 
for a lack of consideration for failure to deliver "signed agreements with 
the Beer Companys to show they have exclusive right to sell in this area.' 
That the provision for "signed agreements" was material both as 
a condition precedent, concurrent, or as consideration was the abundant 
testimony of Mr. Earle about demands for "signed agreements," ;nd Mr. 
Earle's testimony that the contract never came into existence as the result 1 
of failure to deliver "signed agreements" (TT 103-105). Yet, at no time 
did Mr. Oberhansly take the stand and deny any part of the testimony wi~ 
respect to his conversation with Mr. May. It is recognized that Mr. May 
was absent at the time of trial. However, had he been interested in pursw:r·; 1 
his rights, he would have been present. 
The trial court action is further supported by the fact that the 
,·n the t·nan offset any shorcace discrepency or deficiency inventory would more 
in the rent. 
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Further, the shortage in inventory and the additional charges 
against the company between December 6 and 16 or 17, 1974, may have more 
than offset any loss of the deposit on the truck as the result of any acts 
of the Defendants-Respondents. There was no evidence at the time of trial 
of the actual pecuniary loss by the Plaintiffs-Appellants with respect to 
the truck as the result of any acts of the Defendants-Respondents. The only 
testimony at trial was that Mr. Wilcox did not receive the $1000.00 deposit 
(IT 45). Others could have received the $1000.00. The deposit may have 
been lost because the Plaintiff s-Appe 11 ants were in default on the 1 ease. 
Assuming the contract might have been clear and unambiguous, 
Pl a int iffs-Appe 11 ants did not meet the cond it i ans precedent, concurrent or 
oerform materially by deli'lering a distributorship with "signed agreements." 
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs-Appellants received more than adequate compensa-
tion for those parts of the contract ':hat might be considered severable. If 
the trial court e~red in holding the contract and actions of the parties 
ambiguous, uncertain, conflicting and ambivalent, it would be harmless error. 
That it was harmless error can be seen when the monetary value of actual 
losses established are considered: 
Inventory 6 Dec 74 
Less Shortages (TT 63) 
Net Inventory 
Rent from 17 Dec 74 to 17 Feb 75 
@ $350.00 per mo. (Ex. 5) 
Less total payments 
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POINT IV 
WHERE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS FAILED TO GIVE THE DEFENDANTS-
RESPONDENTS NOT! CE OF NON-PAYMENT OF CHECKS OR DE~~AND PAYMENT, O ID NOT 
PROVE THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS RELIED ON CHECKS GIVEN, FAILED TO GIVE 
CONSIDERATION FOR Ch EC KS ISSUED, AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN USELESS FOR THE 
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS TO PERFORM PAYMENT OF THE CHECKS, THE TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRAND JUDGMENT ON THE CHECKS. 
Sec. 7-15-1, UCA (1953): (1) Establishes a cause ofactionfor 
an i nsuffi ci ent funds check. ( 2) Provides for the award of damages in 
amount of check, costs of collection, court and attorneys fees. 
Sec. 7-15-2, UCA (1953): Provides for prima facie evidence of 
intent to defraud when proof is made of issuance of check where there 1•ere 
insufficient funds and within a reasonable time and after notice the ched 
was not good. 
Sec. 7-15-3, UCA (1953): Provides for notice. 
These sections pro vi de for notice by payees or holders in due 
course and do not eliminate defenses against the makers of checks issued 
against insufficient funds where the deficiencies are not made good. 
In Stanford Petroleum v. Janssen, S Ct Ut, 1949, 209 P2d 932, 
where the defendant claimed the trial court erred in dismissing its counter· 
claim, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court and held that the deferdar· 
. I 
could not perform the assignment of a state lease and that the plaintiff's I 
performance was thereby excused. At page 936 the court quotes from the 
re-statement of the law of contracts which is here paraphrased, that no ~a' , 
d · t · n viii I is compelled to do a useless act, and if performance of a con 1 10 
not be follo~ted by performance of a promise, it is useless for the intendea 
purpose and it is therefore unn~cessary to perform the condition, and a 
promise, in judging whether performance of a condition wil I not be follv''ec 
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r Of a promise, is justified in taking the other party at his bv 1Jerror•nance The Plaintiffs-Appellants complain of three checks. The first 
check 1.1as a cneck dated December 6, 1974, in the sum of $1540.93, which 
check was issued by Betty Earle (Ex. 2). Plaintiffs-Appellants also com-
plain about a check dated January 6, 1975, check number 449 of Rainbow 
Properties Corporation, in the sum of $850.00, which recited warehouse 
rent $350.00 and January payment $500.00 (Ex. 3). Also complained about 
,1as a check dated January 6, 1975, in the sum of $1500.00, which was check 
number 450 of Rainbow Properties Corporation and made payable to 0. B. 
Oberhansly (Ex. 4). 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants in their complaint in paragraphs 4, 5 
and 6 of their second cause of action (R 3) allege notice of dishonor and 
fai 1 ure to make payment within ten days. They a 1 so a 11 ege fraud, and 
entitlement to reasonable attorney's fees to recover on fraudulent checks. 
The Defendants-Respondents in their Answer denied the allegations set out 
in the second cause of action as paragraph 4, 5 and 6 (R 6). 
No evidence was presented that notice was given the Defendants-
Respondents as reaui red by the statute. 
The evidence at the time of trial was that the check in the sum 
of $1540.93 (Ex. 2) was issued by Mrs. Earle and was to be held by Mr. 
Oberhansly and replacr2d by a different check (TT 64). The evidence at 
the time of trial was that on December 16 or 17, 1974, Mr. Earle gave to 
Mr. Oberhansly a check on Rainbow Properties- in the sum of $1500.00 (Ex. 4, 
T; 64 ). Mr. Earle asked for the return of Mrs.· Earle's check at the time 
he delivered Exhibit 4 (TT 67). Mrs. Earle's check was never returned (TT 
57 ). The request for the return of Mrs. Earle's check was made several 
'.imes (;T 67) _ Defenriants-Respondents were excused from performance on 
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this check by failure to return the check, i.e., the failure to perform a 
condition. 
The inventory at the warehouse was changed substantially betwee' 
December 6 and December 16 (TT 62). A 1 so, between December 6 and Oecembe' 
16, there were deliveries and charges made against Basin Distributing 
Company (TT 63). The tot a 1 deficiency of inventory with additional de-
1 i veri es to Basin Distributing Company was $1316.05 (TT 63). The only 
discussion of adjustment of inventory based on the deficiency on December 
16, 1974, was with Mr. Oberhansly (TT 67). No agreement was reached with 
respect to an adjustment in the inventory and the matter was in limbo. 
Payment of Exhibit 4, a check for $1500.00, is excused by failure to return , 
Mrs. Earle's check and agreement on the inventory. 
Exhibit 3, dated 1-6-75, in the sum of $850.00, was a Rainbow 
Properties Corporation check number 449. This check was payable to Mr. 
Oberhans 1 y. The reci ta 1 on the check was "rent $350. 00 for January and 
January payment of $500.00." Payment on this check is excused by change 
of date of possession, no delivery of exclusive rights of distributorship 
and changes in inventory for which no adjustment had been made. The 
contract, if there ever was one, had broken down. 
The situation as it existed on January 6, 1975, was as follows: 
Mrs. Earle had not received her check returned to her. The Earles had re-
ceived no written evidence, signed or otherwise, which was evidence of 
. d C'u 
exclusive rights of distributorship as recited in the agreement as evi en· 
by Exhibit 5, lines 24, 25, 26 and 29. 
Furthermore, the inventory was in limbo as shown above. 
Payment of the checks would have been a useless act. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants Wilcox and May argue that the agreements 
are severable. . . t l of the Exhibit 5 recites that cont1nuat1on of the ren a 
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> 
property and the lease of the truck is at the option of the buyer. The 
example of twenty used cars, used in Plaintiffs-Appell ants' Brief to 
illustrate when a contract for the purchase of said cars might be sever-
able, is not analogous to the case at hand. Here the situation is 
comparable to a contract for a car with no engine, the business to keep 
it going. Here the Defendants-Respondents would need the warehouse only 
if they continued the operation of the distributorship, and their continu-
ation of the rental was at their option. By January 6, 1975, it was 
apparent that they had not reached agreement as to the defi ci enci es in 
the inventory, that the evidence of the exclusive rights of distributorship 
from the beer companies had not been received, and consequently the con-
tinuation of the distributorship might not have any value. 
It is also argued by Plaintiffs-Appellants that the lease of the 
truck, or continuation of the 1 ease of the truck, was severable. The truck 
had originally been leased and was used for the distributorship. The only 
use for the truck by the buyers would have been for the continuation of the 
distributorship. Even the continuation of the lease of the truck was at the 
option of the buyers. It was only if they exercised their option to continue 
the lease that they would pay to the Plaintiffs-Appellants the $1000.00 
deposit on the truck. Defendants-Respondents had no opportunity to continue 
the lease or the business. 
In summary, the Plaintiffs-Appellants offered no evidence or 
notice of non-payment as required by statute. Nor did they prove the 
performance of conditions precedent, the furnishing of agreed consideration, 
nor, in fact, did they show any reliance upon the checks. It is also 
apparent from the facts that performance by the Earles would have been a 
useless act by the Earl es as th Pl · A l d e aintiffs- ppel ants were not rea y, 
iill ing or able to · 
- give oerformance of the consideration they were to give 
for payment of the checks. The trial court should be sustained. 
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SUMMARY 
When the evidence is considered in the most favorable light to 
the Defendants-Respondents it is apparent that Exhibit 5 is ambiguous, 
uncertain, conflicting and consequently unenforceable as an agreement 0; 
the parties. That the collateral agreements and undertakings which the 
parties attempted in pursuit of an agreement subsequent to Decembers, 
1974, were loose, ambivalent and uncertain. That the conduct of the partieo 
subsequent to December 5, 1974, in pursuit of an agreement, including the 
issuance of checks, operation of the business, failure to change directors 
or transfer the capital stock were also ambiguous and ambivalent. 
In view of the foregoing, the trial court should be sustained 
in its decision. 
The failure of the Plaintiffs-Appellants to provide the Defendant\· 
Respondents with "signed agreements with the Beer Companys to show they have 
exclusive right to sell in this area," the area of Duchesne and Uintah 
Counties and part of Wasatch County, for Schlitz, Miller and Hamms Beer and 
R. C. Cola and Frostie Root Beer, was a failure of consideration which was 
material and excused the Defendants-Respondents from performance. 
I 
The trial court's allowance of damages in the amount of $2040.93 
was reached with less precision than could be achieved on the record. 
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendants-Respondent' 
the damages should be reduced to $1428.88. This award allows for inventory 
shortages and any claim for rent of the warehouse the Plaintiffs-Appellants 
might have. 
The trial court should be sustained in not allowing recovery on 
d t as required the checks. There was no evidence to the Defendants-Respon en s 
f the checks by the statute. The evidence fully established that payment o 
36 
I 
J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
L 
ld ha ve been a useless gesture on the part of the Defendants-Respondents. viou 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants could not or would not provide signed agreements 
l'lith the beer companies to show they had exclusive right to sell in the 
area of Duchesne, Uintah and part of Wasatch Counties of Sehl itz, Miller, 
and Hamms Beer and R. C. Cola and Frostie Root Beer. 
The trial court observed the witnesses, heard the evidence, heard 
the arguments, and when the evidence is considered in the light most favor-
able to the Defendants-Respondents on appeal, the trial court should be 
sustained. 
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